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Abstract
This work asserts that the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) has been able to retain power in
Taiwan’s apparently competitive democratic system through manipulation of the political party
and electoral systems. These systems have a close relationship in which the electoral system is a
result of the party system. During Taiwan’s transition to democracy the KMT was able to use
their one party dominant position to establish an electoral system which favored them in
elections. This electoral system in turn shaped the emerging political party system to the benefit
of the KMT. Over time, as political conditions in Taiwan shifted, the KMT was able to alter the
electoral and party systems to adapt to their changing needs.

2

Table of Contents
Chapter and Topic

Page

Chapter I: The KMT Political Miracle

4

Introduction

4

Literature Review

7

Chapter II: Taiwan’s Long Road to Democracy

19

KMT Rule and Origins of Democracy in Taiwan

19

Transition from Authoritarian Rule to Democracy

23

Consolidation of Democracy in Taiwan

29

Chapter III: Electoral Analysis

34

Theoretical Context

34

1991 National Assembly Election

41

1996 Presidential Election

49

2000 Presidential Election and DPP Rule

53

2008 Return of the KMT

59

Conclusion

70

Bibliography

74

3

Chapter I:
The KMT Political Miracle
Introduction: The KMT, From Failure to Success
In 1949 the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) was the definition of a failed and impotent
political force. After decades of holding loose control over a weak and backwards China, the
Nationalist Party was driven from the mainland by a peasant army of Communist rebels. The
corrupt and dysfunctional KMT government fled to the island of Taiwan to prevent its total
annihilation by Communist forces. In essence, by 1949 the KMT were little more than a group
of political exiles holed up on an undeveloped island in the Pacific Ocean.
Six decades later the KMT was the ruling party in one of the wealthiest and most
developed nations in Asia. They also sat at the head of a political system widely hailed as one of
the shining examples of democracy in the Eastern world. They had power, money, and a
reputation for efficiency and success. What the KMT had executed could be described as
nothing short of a political miracle. The party had come from the brink of destruction to gaining
nearly everything modern political groups strive towards.
This reversal of fortune was not coincidence. It was not merely through happy
circumstance and the good will of the public that the KMT was able to maintain political control
in such a developed, prosperous, and democratic nation. I contend that it was instead through
deft manipulation of Taiwan’s electoral and party system development that the KMT retained its
expansive power. Through a series of complex and intricate processes, the former authoritarian
party was able simultaneously to manipulate both Taiwan’s electoral and political party systems
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to suit its goals. It is in part due to the complex nature of the relationship between these two
systems that the KMT has been able to obscure these manipulations. It is also due to the unusual
and often perplexing nature of Taiwan’s electoral system that KMT actions in this respect have
gone largely unobserved.
In this thesis I will ascertain the nature of the relationship between Taiwan’s political
party and electoral systems. To this end I will investigate the question: How does the political
party system influence electoral outcomes in Taiwan? I hypothesize that the KMT instituted a
multi-party system specifically designed to favor and strengthen their positions in elections. I
also propose that Taiwan’s electoral system has an endogenous relationship with its party system.
Here I follow Kenneith Benoit’s definition of ‘endogeneity’ which is explained in chapter one of
this thesis.
In the course of this thesis I will analyze Taiwan’s party and electoral systems in contrast
to political science models. These include works by prominent political scientists on democratic
political development, as well as historical reports and analyses of political events in Taiwan. I
examine party decisions especially through laws, political debates, and campaigns by prominent
Taiwanese politicians including debates and campaign ads. Combined with broader secondary
source analysis, these materials will provide the historical framework for my analysis. By
examining these events through the lens of existing political science theory I will attempt to
present a possible explanation behind some of Taiwan’s complex historical and political
developments.
I begin with a review of literature regarding relevant political science theory and
historical developments in Taiwan. I use much of this scholarship as a starting point and base on
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which to build later developments. The literature review section in particular is designed to
provide an introduction to relevant political science models and concepts to readers not
previously familiar with such subject matter. Following this background analysis is a detailing
of Taiwan’s slow transition to democracy and preliminary electoral system development. This
roughly 40-year period of authoritarian KMT rule had considerable influence on events that took
place after Taiwan’s transition to democracy. The chapter is designed to illuminate how the
structure of the modern Taiwanese political system developed and to emphasize the unique
nature of the KMT’s path to modern political dominance. Chapters one and two tend to focus on
political science theory and Taiwanese political sociology respectively. Some readers may find
it appropriate to spend less time on sections with topics they are highly versed in, while spending
more time on topics they are less familiar with. An understanding of both of these subjects is
necessary to a complete understanding of later analysis. In chapter three, I discuss and analyze
the important elections and political developments following Taiwan’s democratic transition.
This is the core of my argument and is perhaps most important to understanding the modern
political situation in Taiwan. In essence, this chapter represents the application of previously
discussed political science models to the individual cases of Taiwanese elections. It details the
actual unfolding of electoral events and the KMT’s movements in the modern Taiwanese
political system. This breakdown of events allows a clear distinction between events that adhere
to prevailing political science models and those that run counter to them. The chapter ends with
a series of conclusions drawn from the results of my research and analysis.

6

Literature Review: Political Science Models in Relation to Taiwan
In this section I will review existing literature, especially by leading theorists such as
Kenneth Benoit, in order to introduce concepts like district magnitude and the introduction of
systemic changes. In the case of Taiwan, I agree with Benoit’s assertion that party politics often
drive electoral systems.
In his essay “Electoral Laws as Political Consequences” Kenneth Benoit redefines the
relationship between the development of electoral systems and political parties. A key concept
in his study is that of “endogeneity,” or a state in which two phenomenon have mutual creating
and shaping effects on each other, rather than any real or direct causal relationship. Benoit
questions the traditional model for the study of this question, in which political party systems
result from electoral systems; he contends instead that the relationship between party systems
and electoral systems is largely endogenous, and in some cases is actually driven by party policy
and influence rather electoral structure. This theoretical structure is congruous with the results of
my research. I therefore contend that in the case of Taiwan, Benoit’s model holds true.
Kenneth Benoit refutes Maurice Duverger’s widely accepted hypothesis that the simple
majority single ballot system favors a two-party system. The hypothesis implies that two-party
systems often develop as a result of the instillation of a simple majority single ballot system and
that multi-party systems often result from proportional representation electoral systems. Benoit
does note, however, that Duverger qualifies this assertion with several statements suggesting that
electoral systems are also to some degree influenced by party systems (Electoral Laws, Benoit
364). My research on the relationship between Taiwan’s party and electoral systems is largely
congruous with Benoit’s proposed model. The Taiwan case affirms a model in which electoral
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systems are the result of political party machinations, which are in turn are shaped by the
emerging electoral system.
In “Electoral Laws as Political Consequences,” Benoit contests Duverger’s hypothesis in
order to assert that the causal relationship between electoral systems and party systems is either
reversed or endogenous in nature. Benoit argues in partisan environments, political parties often
drive the institutionalization of electoral systems. As members of parties, political actors have
vested interests in creating a system that best suits their needs. Larger parties tend to favor
simple majority single ballot systems as these systems aid in the consolidation of their political
power and help discourage the formation of factions and new parties. Smaller parties, on the
other hand, will likely support proportional representation electoral systems as this will allow
them to continue to be effective despite their smaller share of votes. As such, the initial
distribution of power within this preliminary party system will shape the electoral system in
which the parties will exist (Electoral Laws, Benoit 366). Again, nearly all of Kenneth Benoit’s
assertions here apply to the political situation in Taiwan. The actions of the KMT almost exactly
fit Benoit’s description of a dominant political actor legislating electoral rules to suit its purposes.
The relationship between PR vs plurality rules and party power also appear in Taiwan largely as
Benoit would predict, with a few notable exceptions discussed later in this thesis.
Benoit’s theories help us to understand changes in electoral systems in Taiwan during a
period of relative stability. Benoit contests the commonly accepted notion that electoral systems
must stabilize over time. He cites several examples of well-established democracies, such as
those in Japan and New Zealand, in which the electoral system has been significantly altered
despite their apparent stability (Electoral Law, Benoit 385). Electoral systems may change if the
distribution of power shifts within an already existing party system, or key political actors expect
8

to gain from those system changes. In order for change to occur, either new political parties
must gain power, or existing parties must perceive some advantage in the adjustment of the
current electoral system (Electoral Laws, Benoit 387). This phenomenon manifested itself in
Taiwan when the DPP began to gain power. Reforms were undertaken, notably the reform of the
Legislative Yuan’s electoral rules, as the DPP gained the ability to push for a system that better
suited its interests. More notable, however, is that the KMT collaborated with the DPP to
institute these changes as they also carried certain benefits for the KMT.
In “District Magnitude, Electoral Formula, and the Number of Parties” is a second highly
relevant article by Kenneth Benoit. It is closely related to “Electoral Laws as Political
Consequences” in both subject and contention. In this article Benoit deals more specifically with
the mechanics of electoral functions and their relation to party systems. In particular he
examines the concept of district magnitude, or the number of seats allotted to represent a district
in a legislative body. Most established theories on district magnitude indicate that higher
numbers of seats, or larger district magnitude, lead to greater numbers of political parties, while
smaller district magnitude will result in fewer political parties (District Magnitude, Benoit 204).
Benoit argues that while this correlation is generally true, if electoral formula is not controlled
for, resulting correlations drawn between district magnitude and number of parties can be
skewed or even reversed.
If proportional representation is in effect in a district then it is usually true that greater
district magnitude leads to a greater number of political parties, as more seats are available to
represent the interests of smaller parties (District Magnitude, Benoit 204). Benoit asserts
however, that if plurality rules govern the electoral formula in a district then this relationship is
reversed and greater district magnitude actually leads to smaller numbers of political parties.
9

The remainder of Benoit’s article consists of a case study of 1994 Hungarian elections that
Benoit uses to support his claims. The analysis of electoral results in this case study supports
Benoit’s assertions and indicate that both district magnitude and electoral formula must be
considered in order to accurately gauge their effects on party systems (District Magnitude,
Benoit 220).
Unlike Kenneth Benoit’s work in Electoral Laws as Political Consequences, events in
Taiwan largely run counter to his assertions regarding district magnitude. Conditions in the
1990s surrounding the National Assembly and Legislative Yuan elections present particularly
clear examples of this. Despite having had an electoral system marked by a prevalence of both
high district magnitude and plurality rules, high numbers of political parties existed in Taiwan at
this time. The reasons behind this are fairly complex and are discussed in detail later in in
chapter three of this thesis.
Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced
Democracies by Carles Boix asserts that electoral systems are the result of conscious decisions
by political parties made to maximize their representation in the government. Boix contends that
if no changes occur in the electoral arena then the ruling parties will be unmotivated to alter the
electoral system and it will remain constant. If, however there are shifts in political power, or the
ruling party anticipates such shifts, then capable parties will act and alter the electoral system in
their favor (Boix 609). According to his argument, larger more powerful ruling parties will tend
to maintain or introduce plurality rules in order to solidify their position. If smaller parties gain
greater power, or the ruling party anticipates that the current system will erode its power in the
foreseeable future, proportional representation will likely be introduced or maintained (Boix 609).
Additionally Boix contends that the introduction of proportional representation tends to the be
10

the work of left wing parties who are often less well entrenched in the political system than
conservative parties and therefore have more to gain by the rise of new parties (Boix 609).
Many of the concepts that Boix proposes are highly similar to those brought forth by
Benoit. For the purposes of this thesis, Boix largely serves as a source of more in-depth theory
on the likely actions and reactions resulting from shifts in political party power. Additionally,
Boix’s final contention as to the relationship between left-wing parties and proportional
representation is applicable in Taiwan. As his theory would suggest, the left-wing DPP was the
force behind shifts towards PR in the early 2000s. Contrary to what his theory might suggest,
however, this deviation led to a smaller, rather than greater number of political parties. Possible
reasons behind this are discussed in the theoretical context section of this thesis.
District Magnitude, Social Heterogeneity and Local Party System Fragmentation by
Benny Geys discusses the role that socioeconomic factors play in the formation of party systems.
Geys defines the two main approaches to the analysis of party system structures and formation as
the institutional approach and the sociological approach. The institutional approach emphasizes
the role of electoral laws and encompasses the majority of the above described research on the
subject. The sociological approach focuses on the effects of socioeconomic heterogeneity in the
formation of party systems (Geys 281). Geys argues that in order to determine accurately causal
factors and relationships in this process both institutional and sociological approaches must be
utilized. He hypothesizes that both high levels of socioeconomic cleavages and permissive
electoral laws must be in place in order to foster the development of a diverse multi-party system
(Geys 282). To substantiate this claim Geys analyzes a sample set of Belgian municipal
elections over a twelve year period controlling for both socioeconomic and institutional factors
(Geys 281).
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Geys’ findings in his analysis support his hypothesis that relatively high levels
socioeconomic cleavages and permissive electoral laws are much more accurate predictors of
multi-party systems than institutional factors alone. He concludes that the influences of
socioeconomic heterogeneity and district magnitude are mutually interactive forces. The effect of
electoral laws on the party system is greatly strengthened or reduced according to the level of
socioeconomic heterogeneity and vice versa (Geys 294).
Geys’ hypothesis on socioeconomic heterogeneity is relevant to Taiwan’s ethnic
Taiwanese vs Mainland Chinese divides. This duality has played a significant role in shaping
Taiwanese politics, especially in regards to politicians campaign tactics. This dynamic, as well
as most features of the Taiwanese political system, are somewhat unique in Taiwan. Political
science theory alone can do little to explain many of the particularities of the Taiwanese system.
It is therefore necessary to examine the social and historical context of political events in Taiwan,
in order to more fully comprehend the nature of politics in Taiwan.
Taiwan: A Political History by Denny Roy provides a comprehensive and unbiased
political history of Taiwan through its many upheavals and power transitions. Roy’s account is
somewhat unique and highly useful to my research in that it is both highly detailed and largely
objective. While both of these qualities individually are not difficult to find in works concerning
Taiwanese politics, they rarely appear together. Most works are either somewhat general and
incomplete in nature or contain an obvious bias for or against Taiwanese independence. By
avoiding this Roy provides a thorough and believable assessment of the development and early
years of Taiwanese democracy.
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Roy’s Taiwan: a Political History begins with Taiwan’s early history as a primitive island
nation and continues through the early years of the Chen Shui-bian presidency. Much of this,
however, is largely irrelevant to my research and therefore I will refrain from discussing the first
54 pages which detail the early history of Taiwan through the end of colonial Japanese rule. I
will instead focus on the latter three quarters of Roy’s work, which begin with the return of
Taiwan to mainland Chinese control under the Chinese nationalist party, the Kuomintang (KMT).
While my research does not deal directly with the period of authoritarian KMT rule in Taiwan, it
is nevertheless crucial to the development of Taiwan’s current political system.
The central third of the book describes the period of KMT authoritarian rule on Taiwan
and the gradual transition to democracy over the last half of the 20th century. Roy explains that
ethnic differences divided Taiwanese society during the early years of KMT rule and perpetuated
authoritarian rule by the elite mainland Chinese minority. As time progressed the party accepted
growing numbers of Taiwanese members and eased ethnic tensions between the native
Taiwanese and mainland Chinese (Roy 154). Additionally, the KMT instituted gradual political
and economic reforms that moved the island slowly towards democracy. Economic
liberalization policies were highly successful and quickly made Taiwan into one of the wealthiest
and most developed nations in Asia (Roy 99). This, coupled with the KMT’s willingness to
liberalize and institute democratic reforms, put the party in a unique position when Taiwan
finally completed its transition to democracy in the early 1990’s.
Unlike many authoritarian regimes, the KMT government chose to undergo the transition
to democracy at a relatively high point in its popularity. This allowed the former authoritarian
group to have a controlling say in the construction of electoral institutions and to enter the
democratic electoral arena under favorable conditions. By the time the first national legislative
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and presidential elections occurred in the mid-1990’s the KMT was able to retain majority
control of the government under largely fair democratic conditions (Roy 193, 201). In the late
1990’s however, poor performance by the KMT president, as well as factionalism within the
party eroded the KMT’s political position (Roy 203-205). In 2000, a newly consolidated
opposition under the Democratic Progressive Party (DDP) won the presidency and temporarily
ended KMT rule on Taiwan (Roy 227).
As its name suggests, a second key source on Taiwanese political for this thesis Taiwan:
Nation-State or Province? by John F. Copper deals largely with the debate surrounding Taiwan’s
status as a sovereign nation. Copper discusses many of the same events as Denny Roy, and even
goes into a slight degree of further detail regarding the political mechanisms involved in and
resulting from these occurrences. Additionally, since this new 6th edition of Copper’s work was
published in mid-2013 it can be said to be a complete history of modern Taiwanese politics to
the present. The downside to this work vis-à-vis Denny Roy’s is that there appears to be a subtle,
but detectable bias toward the position of Taiwanese reunification with mainland China. While
this apparent bias does not seem to influence Copper’s analysis of the political situation in
Taiwan in any major way, it is enough to raise slight doubts as to his emphasis on the importance
of certain events.
All doubts aside, this work is a detailed and highly useful resource regarding the debate
over Taiwanese sovereignty. The political status of Taiwan is the elephant in the room in
Taiwanese politics and this controversy overshadows nearly every aspect of the Taiwanese
political arena. Elections are won and lost over issues surrounding this debate and it would be
impossible to create any sort of political analysis of Taiwan without considering its influence.
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As useful basis for which to understand the psychology of Taiwan’s political
environment, Copper’s analysis of the origins of Taiwanese political culture should also be
mentioned. He concludes that its components are a mixture resulting from Taiwan’s long history
of subjugation by foreign powers. Emphasis of society over the individual has remained from
times of Japanese colonial rule, while concern for moral and ethical behavior in politics has
resulted from the survival of Confucian vales. Finally, concepts of democracy and popular
elections emerged from Taiwan’s long cold war isolation, close ties to the United States, and a
desire to legitimate the government in the eyes of western nations (Copper 111).
Following on the theme of Taiwanese sovereignty vs unity with mainland China is
Taiwan’s Rising Rationalism: Generations, Politics, and “Taiwanese Nationalism.” In this work,
Shelly Rigger makes a convincing case for the waning of Taiwanese nationalism and the
emergence of increasingly positive views toward Taiwanese reunification with the Chinese
mainland. She contests the idea that there are rising feelings of Taiwanese nationalism among
the youth which will make cross-strait reconciliation more difficult with the passing of time.
Rigger uses generational analysis to show that it is largely the older Taiwanese population who
express nationalist sentiment and tend to support independence, while Taiwanese youth have
increasingly positive views of China. She concludes that the results of her study indicate that
over time relations between Taiwan and mainland China will grow increasingly closer, until the
point at which reunification is more of a formality than a political revolution.
The second book by John F. Copper utilized in this thesis runs concurrent with Shelly
Rigger’s assessment of Taiwan. Taiwan’s Democracy on Trial encompasses an in depth analysis
of Chen Shui-bian’s presidency and Democratic Progressive Party rule over Taiwan. As the first
and only non-KMT president in Taiwanese history, the Chen administration’s rule from 2000 to
15

2008 was a crucial time in the political development of Taiwan. His election in 2000 was the
final proof that Taiwan was a full democracy and even the highest KMT official in the nation
could be voted out of office.
As in Copper’s above mentioned work, Taiwan: Nation-State or Province?, the author
betrays somewhat of a bias in favor of the KMT. Copper’s thorough denunciation of Chen Shuibian at times fails to feel objective due to its harshness. Copper does, however, rely nearly
entirely on factual analysis and logic to support his conclusions and therefore this analysis is still
a valuable resource with which to examine eight crucial years in Taiwanese democracy.
Copper’s analysis of Chen Shui-bian’s presidency concludes that he was a poor leader,
who harmed Taiwanese national interest, including many causes which he claimed to champion.
Copper asserts that under Chen’s reign human rights, press freedom, ethnic relations, economic
performance, and clean governance all deteriorated (Taiwan’s Democracy Copper 83). Chen
Shui-bian also harmed the cause of Taiwanese independence, which was a founding principle of
his party, by alienating the United States and increasing Taiwan’s economic dependence on
mainland China (Taiwan’s Democracy Copper 83).
Shifting to a more specific case-analysis of Taiwanese electoral politics is The Legislative
Yuan Elections in Taiwan: Consequences of the Electoral System. This article by Andrew J.
Nathan deals specifically with the electoral system in place during Taiwan’s first, nationwide
democratic election in 1992. Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan represents the legislative branch of the
Taiwanese government and has several important functions including the power to pass laws,
review the budget, and approve the nomination of the premier (Nathan 424). As such, the

16

election of this body under Taiwan’s first national democratic election marks an important step
in the consolidation of Taiwanese democracy.
In this essay Nathan examines the electoral system of nearly all democratically elected
positions present in Taiwan at this time. Most notable however, is his description of the
Legislative Yuan’s electoral system and its influence on election results. The election was held
under the somewhat rare single-vote, multi-member constituency (SVMM) system. This system
differs from the single-vote, single-member (SVSM) and proportional representation systems in
that each voter only has one vote but there are multiple representatives per electoral district
(Nathan 425). This strategic voting that this system encourages is also somewhat unusual. Since
more the more candidates who run, the fewer votes are needed to win, large numbers of
candidates have incentive to participate in the elections (Nathan 428). The system also creates a
unique strategic advantage for KMT candidates. It creates logical incentive and reward for
parties that are able to nominate the number of candidates they expect to win with the number of
votes they expect to receive, then distribute those votes evenly among candidates so that each
candidate has the bare minimum it needs to win (Nathan 432). Only the KMT had the political
organization necessary to carry out this process and therefore had somewhat of an advantage in
this election. Under this system voters also faced an unusual dilemma. Since they only have one
vote for multiple seats, voters often must choose between members of the same party or group
that often represent similar interests. Logically they would prefer to vote for the candidate that
supports their interests and that they believe has the best chance of winning. However, if this
candidate is too popular their vote will be wasted since it will simply be excess and could have
been spent on another of their preferred candidates. Conversely, their vote is also wasted if they
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cast it in favor of a candidate who is too unpopular and therefore will lose regardless of their
support (Nathan 433).
Andrew Nathan’s article is of a much smaller scope than any of the previously described
analyses of Taiwan’s political system. Despite this, its specific description of Taiwanese
electoral systems and their political consequences is invaluable. By revealing close ties between
the evolution Taiwan’s electoral and party systems, Nathan’s work represents perhaps one of the
most directly relevant resources to my research.
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Section II:
Taiwan’s Long Road to Democracy
Introduction:
Democratization is a process that has varied greatly in length and scope across different
nations and time periods. In the 20th century many transitions to democracy occurred
relatively swiftly, often through revolution or rapid liberalization by new leaders. Taiwan’s
democratization stands in contrast to these cases in that its transition required nearly a half of a
century to reach full completion. Since its beginning the KMT stated that it had some eventual
intent to democratize. Despite this, Taiwan’s unique political situation caused the process of
democratization in Taiwan to drag out over most of the last half of the 20th century. Typical
roadblocks to liberalization, such as external threats and opposition among conservative elites,
impeded the development of democracy in Taiwan, while changes in leadership, as well as
pressure both from the Taiwanese people and the international community helped further
political liberalization on the island nation.
KMT Rule and the Origins of Democracy in Taiwan:
The story of democracy in Taiwan began in 1949 when the nationalist government of the
Republic of China (ROC) relocated the entirety of its government organs, economic resources,
and military to the island. The move was the result of the KMT’s recent loss of a long and
bloody civil war with the Chinese Communist Party on the mainland. It was essentially a retreat
intended to prevent the annihilation of the nationalist government and allow them to regroup and
prepare for a counter attack on communists to retake the mainland. This goal of a military
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recapture of China was to remain the main focus of the KMT in Taiwan for the next two decades
(Roy 2003, 77).
During the first several decades of its rule, the ROC in Taiwan operated under a oneparty authoritarian system in which the division between KMT and the government was
indistinct. All officials in the government were members of the KMT and local Taiwanese were
largely exempt from politics. The KMT employed the use of a large propaganda machine to
promote its agenda, and utilized a powerful security apparatus to ensure that its policies were
obeyed. Beginning in May of 1949 the entire island of Taiwan was placed under martial law, a
policy which would not be reversed for 37 years (Roy 2003, 78).
One of the factors that Paul Brooker (Brooker 2009, 134) discusses in his analysis on
one-party regimes and maintenance of control in authoritarian systems is the use of an external
enemy threat to legitimate the regime. During the first two decades of their rule on Taiwan, the
KMT relied largely on this tactic in order to maintain legitimacy. The People’s Republic of
China on the mainland was depicted as a communist bandit uprising that had temporarily taken
control of the government. The KMT claimed that the harsh restrictions on society that it
implemented were designed to protect the Taiwanese people from Communist attack (Roy 2003,
79).
Although the local population of Taiwan had a strong dislike for mainland Chinese and
the KMT government, they were aware of the stark reality that ROC rule was necessary for their
safety. Despite the harshness of KMT rule, it was largely viewed as the preferable alternative to
rule by the Chinese Communists. Mao Zedong had no base for support in Taiwan and therefore
could only plausibly wrest the island from nationalist control through a military invasion. The
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Taiwanese people were aware that conflict of this sort would be fought on Taiwanese soil with
huge costs in loss of life and property damage (Copper 2013, 47). Therefore, in the Taiwanese
case, the use of an external enemy to legitimate authoritarian rule was very effective in the short
term.
The founder of the KMT, Sun Yat-sen had included in the party’s original doctrine that
democracy was an eventual goal of the party. The KMT in Taiwan continued to espouse this
goal, with several limitations. Party policy alleged that a period of KMT party dictatorship was
necessary in order to establish the proper conditions for democracy in Taiwan. According to
Brooker (Brooker 2009, 137) this is another common claim that authoritarian regimes make in a
bid for legitimacy. By claiming this eventual goal of democracy the KMT desired to set itself
apart from the CCP on the mainland who had no such goal. Additionally, to solidify the
plausibility of this claim, the KMT began to hold elections at the local level soon after their
arrival in Taiwan. These elections were somewhat competitive, and it was certainly possible for
non-KMT candidates to win seats, however the odds were heavily slanted in the KMT’s favor.
KMT candidates enjoyed the full financial backing of the government to finance their campaigns
and would often provide voters with food, transportation, entertainment, and gifts. Since
opposition parties were illegal under ROC rule, non-KMT candidates were forced to run as
independents and therefore lacked the support and funding that political parties typically provide
(Roy 2003, 85). Despite the transparency of this attempt to legitimate an authoritarian regime,
the establishment of local elections was an important step in Taiwan’s democratization.
Performance legitimacy often arises as the primary method of maintaining legitimacy in
many authoritarian regimes (Huntington 1991, 46). Regimes employing performance legitimacy
attempt to justify their domination of the nation through evidence of the economic and
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developmental benefits that their policies bring. The KMT realized the benefit of this approach
early on as it became clear that a swift recapture of mainland China from communist forces
would not be possible. Beginning in the mid-1950’s the KMT regime began a series of measures
liberalizing the economy, including the privatization of many state-owned industries. These
reforms continued through the 1960’s with tax cuts, land reform, and continued privatization that
shifted the Taiwanese economic system from that of a control economy to one of market
capitalism. These reforms were highly successful and over the following two decades Taiwan
boasted one of the fastest growing economies in the world (Copper 2013, 49). This feat greatly
increased the KMT regime’s legitimacy domestically and abroad thus supporting the concept of
performance legitimacy and its potential value to an authoritarian regime.
In their 2005 article “International Linkage and Democratization,” Levetsky and Way
discuss the concepts of linkage and leverage and their effects on democratization (Levitsky
2005). Linkage is a measure of the degree to which the nation is connected economically,
socially, and geopolitically to other nations, specifically other to democracies. Higher degrees of
connection to democracies increase the political costs of supporting oppressive regimes.
Leverage, on the other hand, is the ability to directly and forcefully exert pressure on an outside
government through measures such as economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure, and military
intervention. Linkage is generally considered to be a more effective democratizing force than
leverage. Leverage can have unintended consequences, especially in the case of military
interventions, and can occasionally backfire and increase feelings of nationalism and support for
the regime. Since linkage is less heavy-handed and works from within the nation it is much
more difficult for the authoritarian regime to circumvent and much less likely to backfire.
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Although the foresight to initiate the economic liberalization which led to Taiwan’s rapid
development could be contributed in part to the KMT leadership, there was also external
influence on this decision. The United States government took measures to increase both its
linkage and leverage with Taiwan with a high degree of success. In the late 1950’s the United
States offered extensive economic aid to Taiwan under the condition that they liberalize their
economy and move towards economic capitalism. This is a clear example of leverage through
conditionality. Only by liberalizing would the KMT receive United States aid to spur the
development of Taiwan. By the time this aid ceased in 1964, Taiwan’s economy was essentially
a market capitalist system and its development was largely self-sustained (Copper 2013, 49).
Economic liberalization in Taiwan also increased the island’s linkage with democratic
nations. As the Taiwanese people and the KMT government began to realize that exports needed
to be a major focus to ensure economic prosperity, increased international trade made the island
more open and cosmopolitan. This helped facilitate the gradual spread of more liberal and less
extremist political philosophies among the Taiwanese people, as well as some members of the
KMT regime (Copper 2013, 49)
Transition from Authoritarianism to Democracy
In The Third Wave, Huntington (Huntington 1991) argues that transitions to democracy
can be grouped into three types: transformation, replacement, and transplacement.
Transformations are transitions in which the authoritarian regime and ruling elites are the main
drivers of democratization. They are characterized first by the emergence of softliners within the
ruling party, or elites willing to initiate some degree of liberalization within the regime, followed
by the rise to power of these actors. Limited liberalization by these individuals then is
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unsuccessful and democracy emerges as the only viable way forward. Regime leaders then work
together with opposition forces to design a transition to a democratic system.
Replacement can be seen as the opposite of transformation in the sense that the transition
to democracy is driven by the opposition forces rather than the ruling elites. This course is
characterized by a successful struggle by opposition forces to topple the authoritarian regime,
followed by a rapid struggle to form a new regime in its place. This is likely the least desirable
of the three types of transitions as the sudden removal of the authoritarian regime creates a power
vacuum that has the potential to destabilize the country.
As their name suggests, transplacements fall somewhere between transformations and
replacements. In transplacents, both regime and non-government actors work together to
negotiate the transition to democracy. As the regime leaders take limited liberalization measures
they begin to lose some of their power and control. Opposition forces then utilize this loss of
control to intensify their action against the regime, to which incites forceful suppression by the
government. Eventually the two sides reach a standoff and realize that a negotiated transition is
the only way forward.
Of these Huntington’s three types of transitions to democracy the only type that can be
definitively ruled out in the Taiwanese case is replacement. During no part of Taiwan’s
transition to democracy can opposition forces have been said to gain the upper hand. Even when
Taiwan’s democracy was consolidated in the 2000 presidential election, the nationalist party did
not fall; it simply lost the presidency. The democratization process leading up to this transition
was gradual and largely planned and at no point was there any sort of open struggle to develop a
new system of government (Copper 2013, 58).
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Taiwan’s transition to democracy could therefor best be described as a transformation
with some elements of transplacement. The increased political liberalization and
democratization on the island was engineered and guided by the ruling KMT elite following the
gradual emergence of softliners within the party. While these are the typical circumstances for a
transformation, the transition in Taiwan was also the result of decades of increasing pressure
from opposition forces and would not likely have been undertaken without their influence.
Since its arrival on Taiwan, the KMT had espoused democracy as an eventual goal of the
party. By the mid-1970’s however, many Taiwanese believed that the pace of this
democratization was beginning to appear too slow to be meaningful. The lack of ability to
garner legitimacy through commitment to eventual democracy put increased pressure on the
KMT regime to liberalize. Additionally, the immediate threat of war with the mainland that had
helped to justify many of the KMT’s harsher authoritarian restrictions on Taiwanese society was
beginning to dissipate, further eroding the legitimacy of continued one-party dictatorship. These
pressures led to liberalization measures over the next two decades that eventually culminated in
full democratization on Taiwan (Roy 2003, 153).
Since the arrival of the KMT on Taiwan in 1949, four fifths of the population of Taiwan
had been native Taiwanese. Despite this, until the 1970’s the small minority of mainland
Chinese had occupied nearly every position in the KMT government. This naturally created
feelings of resentment among the native Taiwanese population who felt that they were being
dominated by a foreign presence. This was an increasingly destabilizing factor the KMT regime
as Taiwan’s economic development enabled the rise of larger and larger numbers of Taiwanese
economic elites. In order to help resolve this issue, the KMT realized that it would need to give
the Taiwanese greater ability to participate in the government. Beginning in the early 1970’s the
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KMT began admitting Taiwanese to the party and letting them occupy positions in the
government. By 1985 Taiwanese occupied all government positions at the city and county levels,
as well as 75 percent of positions at the provincial level, and one third of the seats on the KMT
central standing committee (Copper 2013, 154). These Taiwanese brought with them more
liberal and democratic goals for KMT rule and many would eventually become that softliners
that helped drive Taiwan’s democratization.
Ironically, the presence of the communist government on mainland China was also a
strong impetus in the development of democracy on Taiwan. As time wore on it became clear to
even the most hardline KMT elites that the only possibility of retaking the mainland would be
through political means. To accomplish this, the KMT would have to establish Taiwan as a
model for a free and successful Chinese state that Chinese on the mainland could look to as a
preferable alternative to communist rule. This was obviously not possible if Taiwan was under
the control of a repressive authoritarian government and therefore at least some political
liberalization was seen to be necessary (Roy 2003, 155).
In the book Democratization, Christian Welzel (Bernhagen 2009, 89) discusses a causal
model for mass responsive democratization. The model indicates that a “national or domestic
trigger event” often immediately precipitates democratization in an authoritarian state. While
Taiwan’s course of democratization could not truly be considered mass responsive
democratization, pressure from the Taiwanese people was certainly an important factor Taiwan’s
transition to democracy. The power change that occurred in Taiwan following KMT leader,
Chiang Kai-shek’s death could be considered one major trigger event.
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In 1978 Chiang Ching-kuo assumed the presidency of the ROC. While his father and
predecessor, Chiang Kai-shek had ruled in a heavy-handed dictatorial manner, Chiang Chingkuo was a reformer who took many bold and crucial steps to democratize Taiwan. He began in
the late 1970’s by rooting out corrupt and incompetent officials in the government and loosening
restrictions on the press, particularly in regard to reporting on government officials and policies.
In 1980 Chiang Ching-kuo oversaw Taiwan’s first national democratic election, followed by a
second in 1983. Although the elections favored KMT members, and all opposition candidates
had to run as independents, the elections were still largely competitive. Despite the lack of true
fairness in these elections they greatly furthered the cause of democratization because they
helped to ease the fear of many KMT elites that they would fall into political oblivion in a multiparty system (Copper 2013, 53).
In a 1986 meeting of the KMT’s central committee Chiang Ching-kuo called for major
reforms in the government that established the foundation for true democracy in Taiwan. Most
crucial among these reforms were the restructuring of parliament, the end of martial law, and a
lifting on the ban on the formation of new political parties. As a direct result of these reforms the
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) became the first legal opposition party in Taiwanese history.
It and the KMT participated in the first two-party election in December of 1986 competing for
seats in the Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly (Copper 2013, 53).
In Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, O’Donnell and Schmitter examine the
importance of the emergence of hardliners and softliners in the process of democratization. This
is highly relevant to the case of Taiwanese democratization due to the driving role that the
authoritarian KMT regime had in the liberalization and transition process. Had softliners such as
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Chiang Ching-kuo not emerged as a controlling force within the KMT it is unlikely that
opposition forces would have been able or willing to force democratization on Taiwan.
O’Donnell and Schmitter (O’Donnell 1986, 16) characterize hardliners as members of
the ruling regime that, either for ideological or personal reasons, oppose liberalization and
democratization within the government. Self-interest and desire to hold onto power are often
motivating factors for these types, although many are driven by a true ideological opposition to
democracy. It is often difficult to determine what the true motive of certain hardliners may be,
however, since those motivated by personal interest will rarely declare this publically. Chiang
Ching-kuo’s father, Chiang Kai-shek would certainly fall into the category of hardliner. Chiang
Kai-shek was driven by an overriding ideological determination that it was the KMT’s destiny to
return to mainland China to overthrow the Communist regime. As such, he viewed
democratization at best as a lofty future goal to declare for increased legitimacy and at worst as a
destabilizing and subversive force in Taiwan (Roy 2003, 83).
In contrast to hardliners, O’Donnell and Schmitter describe softliners as members of the
ruling elite that accept at least some degree of liberalization and democratization as necessary
inevitabilities. While these types may not necessarily support democracy, they recognize that the
regime cannot exist without legitimacy and that legitimacy will be increasingly difficult to
maintain under an authoritarian system. O’Donnell and Schmitter also add that the ideal time for
an authoritarian regime to initiate a transition to democracy is at a time of strong performance
and high success for the regime, but that paradoxically this is also the least likely time for a
transition to occur. Since the regime is preforming so well during this time it often seems to
discredit the softliner argument that liberalization and democratization are necessary and
inevitabilities.
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After the death of Chiang Kai-shek in 1975, the KMT experienced increasing levels of
softliner domination within the party. In fact, the case of Taiwan is unique in the level of success
that KMT softliners had in steering government policies towards democratization. This success
was so great that the KMT was able to overcome O’Donnell and Schmitter’s dilemma of
inability to transition at a time of high regime performance. At the time that Chiang Ching-kuo
called for the lifting of military rule and an end to the ban on political opposition parties in 1986,
Taiwan had one of the most successful economies in the world. In addition, gradual
liberalization efforts over the last decade had further increased support for the KMT so that when
the transition to democracy was finally undertaken in earnest, the regime was in near total
control of the process (Copper 2013, 53). This foresight by KMT softliners is likely the reason
that the party has been able to maintain an important position in Taiwanese politics and was
voted back into the presidency in 2008 (Copper 2013, 61).
Consolidation of Democracy in Taiwan
Chiang Ching-kuo died in early 1988 and left Lee Teng-hui as president of the ROC and
chairman of the KMT. Lee was the first native Taiwanese to lead the KMT and over the next
decade oversaw the final stages of the consolidation of Taiwan’s democracy. Despite this
accomplishment, Lee was a controversial figure who was criticized by both conservatives and
reformers alike. KMT conservatives believed that he was moving towards full democratization
too rapidly and was secretly supporting Taiwanese independence from the mainland. Reformists,
on the other hand, thought that Lee might be more concerned with securing his own personal
power than in consolidating democracy (Roy 2003, 183).
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In 1991 Lee Teng-hui asked all non-elected officials in the National Assembly to step
down. Later that year an election was held and a new National Assembly was formed, many of
whose members were reform-minded Taiwanese such as Lee. The KMT performed well in this
election and helped to further validate the idea of full democracy in the eyes of the few
conservative holdouts within the party. This election paved the way for a meeting of the new
National Assembly in March of 1992 and the implementation of several key amendments to the
ROC constitution. These included a shortening of members of the National Assembly’s terms to
four years, the position of mayor in Taiwan’s two largest cities becoming elected positions, and
an elimination of the paramilitary body which had carried out many of the harsh authoritarian
policies of the earlier KMT (Roy 2003, 191).
In 1994 the National Assembly met again and carried out the final great step in
democratizing Taiwan’s political system. The president and vice-president of the ROC would
now be directly elected officials, with the first presidential election to be held in 1996 (Copper
2013, 56). All major positions in the Taiwanese government would now be filled by elected
officials. All that remained now was a power change that could signify the true fairness and
consolidation of Taiwan’s new democracy.
Lee Teng-hui announced that he would be the candidate KMT for president in the 1996
elections, running against the DDP candidate, Peng Ming-min. For a variety of reasons,
including the recent successful economic and political liberalization policies that the KMT had
implemented, Lee Teng-hui and the KMT won the presidency. The election was generally
accepted as fair and competitive, with the DDP loss resulting from factionalism and extremism
within the party rather than any undemocratic attempts by the KMT to alter the outcome (Roy
2003, 202).
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In chapter 6 of Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, O’Donnell and Schmitter
(O’Donnell 1986) argue that authoritarian regimes often overestimate their popular support and
are unprepared for their failure in founding elections of new democracies. To support this they
cite examples of regimes such as that in Argentina and Brazil who experienced relatively swift
transitions from authoritarian government to democracy and often did so under unfavorable
circumstances. The Taiwanese case stands in stark contrast to these examples. The KMT had
been gradually liberalizing for half of a century and had been earnestly preparing the party and
the nation for democracy for at least a decade. The opposition DDP also had little control in the
formation of the electoral system in which it would be competing and therefore was less versed
in its nuances than the KMT. Finally, due to its highly successful economic policies and
willingness to liberalize, the KMT had high levels of popular support at the time of the 1996
election. These factors combined to allow the KMT, the former authoritarian one-party
dictatorship of Taiwan, to retain power in a free and democratic election.
The results of the next second presidential election in 2000 were not as favorable to the
KMT as the first. Lee Teng-hui decided not to run for reelection, and his replacement candidate,
Lien Chan, was somewhat lacking in popular support. While he was highly educated and had
much experience in the government, Chan was viewed as somewhat of an aloof elite and
therefore had difficulty winning the popular vote. Additionally, the KMT began to factionalize
in the 1996 to 2000 period. Much of the party did not support Chen’s candidacy and therefore
cast their vote with KMT member James Soong, who ran as an independent in the election.
These factors left a weakened KMT with a split vote facing a newly united and moderated DDP
(Copper 2013, 58).
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DDP candidate Chen Shui-bian was a skilled politician who knew how to navigate the
new popular election. Chen was younger and from a poor Taiwanese family and was able to
utilize these ethnic and socioeconomic roots to gain the sympathy with the common Taiwanese.
He moderated many of the extremist policies that had caused the DDP to perform poorly in
previous elections, including a cessation of his advocacy for formal Taiwanese independence
from the mainland. The DDP had learned from their previous failures and was no longer
factionalized as it had been in the 1996 elections. As a result of these changes, the DDP’s Chen
Shui-bian won the presidency in the 2000 election signaling the final consolidation of democracy
in Taiwan (Copper 2013, 59).
Chen Shui-bian won by a slim margin in Taiwan’s founding election. His victory was
due in large part to factionalism within the KMT and his presidency saw Taiwan experience
many political and economic hardships (Copper 2013, 61). Nevertheless, his victory in the 2000
election and reelection in 2004 was one of the most important events in Taiwanese history. They
marked the final consolidation of democracy in Taiwan and the end of centuries of authoritarian
rule.
Conclusion:
The course of democratization in Taiwan was much longer and more gradual than in most
nations. The KMT’s half of a century old goal of democratization was a step by step process that
began with local elections in the 1950’s and culminated with a democratic presidential election
in 2000. Factors impeding democracy, such as national security concerns and opposition by
regime hardliners, faded over time. Conversely, conditions conducive to democracy, such as the
emergence of reformists within the KMT and economic prosperity became more apparent as
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time went on. By the end of the 20th century Taiwan, its people, and its leaders were finally able
to complete and consolidate Taiwan’s transition to democracy.
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Section III:
Electoral Analysis
Theoretical Context
Much of the political science theory referenced in the following section is previously
discussed in the literature review section of this thesis. Despite this, it is helpful to a more
complete analysis of Taiwan’s founding elections to discuss these concepts specifically within
the context of Taiwan. By framing certain events within these theoretical contexts, we can begin
to see possible patterns and logical decisions driving events in the seemingly chaotic Taiwanese
political landscape.
It is important to note that the topic of Taiwanese electoral politics is relatively common
among Chinese language sources in Taiwan. Despite this prevalence of scholarship it is
somewhat difficult to locate non-partisan material on the topic. This problem renders much of
the Chinese language analysis on the subject unreliable and counterproductive to nonbiased
assessments of the KMT and the Taiwanese party and electoral systems. One good example of
this is Wu Zhenjia of Taiwan National University’s work on the subject. Wu is the author of an
extensive work on Taiwanese and Japanese electoral system development. Chapter four of his
work details the evolution of Taiwan’s electoral system from its embryonic stages under the
KMT one-party dictatorship, to its more recent history in the early 2000’s. The work asserts that
since the early 1990’s there has essentially been no electoral system reform in Taiwan (Wu
Zhenjia, 152). While this is an interesting perspective on the topic of Taiwanese electoral system
development, according to most other sources of scholarship it is largely unfounded. Taiwan has
seen a plethora of electoral reforms since its transition to democracy, many of which are detailed
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later in this chapter. For a variety of reasons, the many Chinese language sources on electoral
system development in Taiwan tend to be similarly influenced by their author’s own political
concerns. As such, while I include some such sources at relevant points, I attempt to avoid
coloring my own assessments with these authors’ analytic conclusions.
To frame the political significance of the Taiwan’s 1990s elections it is useful to consider
prominent political scientist Kenneth Benoit’s 2007 essay “Electoral Laws as Political
Consequences.” As discussed in the literature review of this thesis, Benoit’s essay deals largely
with the nature of the relationship between political party and electoral systems. He alleges that
the two systems are largely endogenous, with both having effects that shape the other (Electoral
laws, Benoit 364). In the context of Taiwan this model seems to fit the political landscape
during the nation’s democratic consolidation, with a few caveats. The ‘endogenous’ process of
party and electoral system formation in Taiwan appears to have been somewhat engineered.
Rather than an environment of open partisan debate, the electoral system in Taiwan was largely
legislated into existence by the ruling KMT. By most accounts this process was consciously
controlled by KMT leadership to design a system that would allow them to retain maximum
political power (Dryer, 68). The party system therefore resulted in an electoral system, which in
turn shaped the new party system.
Another key point in Benoit’s article that is highly applicable to the situation in Taiwan,
concerns the manner in which party systems shape electoral rules. According to Benoit, larger
parties tend to favor simple majority single ballot, also known as, plurality systems. These types
of electoral rules theoretically aid them in consolidating and retaining their power. Conversely,
smaller parties will favor proportional representation (PR) systems, since this allows their
interests to be represented despite their relatively small bases of support. This is phenomenon
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played out almost exactly as Benoit’s article would suggest. In the early 1990’s the KMT
designed electoral system for the National Assembly put 225 of the 325 seats up for election
under simple majority single ballot rules. The remaining 100 seats were to be chosen from a
proportional slate. This would seem somewhat contrary to the KMT’s large party interests,
however, closer examination of the rules reveals the origin of the discrepancy. Despite the
existence of both plurality and PR elections, each voter was only allowed to cast one vote
(Dreyer, 68). This effectively meant that the party that won the plurality elections automatically
won the PR elections, thereby nullifying any benefits that the PR elections would normally have
for smaller parties. This particularity was accordingly contested by the DPP, who were
nevertheless powerless to change it.
A 1999 article in The American Political Science Review by Charles Boix puts forward
an explanation of party and electoral system interaction that is even more relevant to events in
Taiwan. Like Benoit, Boix holds that larger parties will tend to favor the establishment of
plurality rules, while smaller parties will tend to favor PR systems. Boix goes further in saying
that when smaller parties gain power, they will likely introduce a PR electoral system. This was
seemingly the case in Taiwan when the Legislative Yuan under Chen Shui-bian’s administration
introduced electoral reforms strengthening the PR system. The Legislative Yuan electoral
system was switched from plurality rules to a parallel vote system. Under the new system the
number of seats in the Legislative Yuan was cut from 225 to 113. 73 of these seats are filled
through mixed single-member district elections, 34 are filled from a proportional slate, and 6 are
reserved for Taiwanese aboriginals (Yu, 9). While the majority of seats are still filled through
plurality rules, the number of seats filled through PR is a marked increase over the previous
system. This shift is especially interesting to note, as these changes bear a strong resemblance to
36

the National Assembly reforms that the DPP had attempted to push for more than a decade
previously. On the surface it is also consistent with Boix’s additional contention that shifts
towards a PR system tend to be the work of left-leaning actors who are less entrenched in the
political system (Boix, 609). In theory this should allow these parties greater representation
despite lack of entrenchment in the political infrastructure usually characteristic of conservative
parties.
It is here that the much of the prevailing theory on party and electoral systems begins to
encounter problems. Rather than allowing for greater representation of minority parties and
pushing towards a multi-party system, the 2004 Legislative Yuan reforms marginalized smaller
parties and strengthened Taiwan’s two major parties. In the early 2000’s James Soong’s Peoples
First Party (PFP) and Lee Teng-hui’s Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) were significant political
actors. At the 2001 Legislative Yuan election both minority parties made significant gains and
obtained enough influence that many speculated Taiwan was on its way to a multi-party system
(Copper, 60). After the reforms had taken effect however, both the PFP and the TSU were
marginalized to the point of near insignificance. The 2008 Legislative Yuan elections saw
cutting losses for both parties, the KMT assuming a significant majority and the DPP taking the
position of opposition minority (Yu, 10).
Why did the shift to a parallel voting system marginalize, rather than strengthen minority
parties in Taiwan? The answer lies in the unique nature of the electoral system previously
utilized to fill seats in the Legislative Yuan. This could best be described as a single-vote multimember constituency (SVMM) system. Under these rules, most districts have multiple
representatives but each voter can only cast one vote. The system is highly unique and, outside
of Taiwan, Japan is the only other nation where similar electoral guidelines are in place (Nathan,
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425). The SVMM system encourages candidates with relatively small constituencies to run for
office since, the more candidates that run, the less votes are needed to win. This means that a
candidate with a small, but loyal support base could easily win office, as long as his opponents
were numerous enough to split the undecided vote. This environment was fertile ground for
small parties and independents who could win election through careful electoral strategizing
rather than widespread support (Nathan, 427). Therefore, when the 2004 Legislative Yuan
amendments altered this system, smaller political actors found it much more difficult to gain
representation and most were all but eliminated.
The question then arises as to why the KMT would put these sorts of electoral rules into
place. At the time of the Legislative Yuan’s electoral system establishment the KMT were by far
the majority party and had near total control of the process. According to both Kenneth Benoit
and Charles Boix’s theories on party systems and electoral system formation, majority parties
should favor the establishment of plurality rules to reinforce their political control. The KMT,
however, crafted a system which encouraged the formation and election of minority parties. On
the surface this appears counter-productive to the KMT’s goals, however, closer examination
reveals it to be a well-calculated political maneuver. Since the more candidates that participated
in a given election, the less votes were needed to win, this system benefited the KMT by dividing
the opposition. Rather than facing a coherent, well organized opposition party, this system
allowed the KMT to pit their well-funded and experienced members against a slew of
independents and smaller party candidates. This strategy kept the opposition divided and the
KMT in charge.
More than a decade later, changing circumstances in the political environment made the
same special features of this system, which had once benefited the KMT, detrimental to its
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interests. As discussed in detail later in this thesis, the KMT began to face serious problems with
factionalization and loss of party discipline in the late 1990’s. KMT candidates would often run
in elections without the consent of party leadership and would often actively work against other
KMT factions in their region (Roy, 205). Since the SVMM system required excellent planning
and organization in order to win elections, these issues began to cause serious problems for the
KMT. Too many KMT candidates would appear on ballots, divide the vote, and allow the
opposition to take advantage of the same strategy originally developed by the KMT. As a result,
the latter half of the 1990’s saw a series of losses for the KMT which eventually culminated in
their highly disappointing performance in the 2001 Legislative Yuan elections.
The 2001 elections saw a great strengthening of the newly organized PFP, almost
exclusively at the expense of the KMT (Copper 2013, 60). At this time it is useful to again
consider Kenneth Benoit and Charles Boix’s theory on electoral system choice. According to
this theoretical framework, shifts towards PR systems should be undertaken when the political
power balance changes and minority parties gain power. Therefore, after the 2001 Legislative
Yuan elections, when both the PFP and the TSU were strengthened, the electoral system should
have shifted towards PR and solidified their positions. While the proportion of Legislative Yuan
seats filled from a proportional slate did increase, these parties were nevertheless hedged out of
power as a result of the reforms.
The discrepancy between the theory and actual unfolding of events again lies in the
particularities of the previous Legislative Yuan electoral rules. The SVMM system was so
conducive to minority party interests, that a shift towards parallel voting actually hurt these
parties rather than helping them. Therefore, in this particular event, the inability to apply the
prevailing theory on party and electoral system formation was not an inherent failure of the
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theory itself. Rather, the discrepancy was due to the uniqueness of Taiwan’s electoral system
and lack of scholarship on how it may fit into the existing theoretical framework.
Examples of political phenomenon that are largely unexplainable with common party and
electoral system theory are surprisingly common in Taiwan. One further one which merits
mentioning is the issue of district magnitude and number of political parties. According to
Kenneth Benoit’s 2001 article “District Magnitude, Electoral Formula, and Number of Parties,”
larger district magnitudes under PR systems should lead to greater numbers of political parties.
Conversely, under plurality rules, larger district magnitudes should lead to a smaller number of
parties (District magnitude, 204). For most of the 1990’s both Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan and its
National Assembly elected a majority of their members through plurality rules and a smaller
proportion through PR. Additionally, both of these bodies had somewhat large district
magnitudes in their electoral system. According to Benoit’s theory, these factors should have
yielded a smaller number of political parties. In reality however, there were so many parties
under the system in the 1990’s that many suggested that a multi-party system was taking shape in
Taiwan.
Much of the disconnect between theory and actuality is related to the nation’s highly
mixed and somewhat distinct electoral rules. Most of the top governing bodies in Taiwan
maintain mixed electoral systems with a majority of seats being chosen through plurality rules
and a significant minority from PR slates. Since a majority of the scholarship on party and
electoral system relations include plurality rules vs proportional representation as key
determining variables, it is difficult to adapt these concepts accurately to Taiwan’s situation.
Additionally, as previously discussed with the case of the Legislative Yuan and SVMM system,
much of Taiwan’s electoral system is not only mixed, but also highly unique. Upon closer
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analysis it appears that many of Taiwan’s electoral guidelines may be intentionally confusing or
vague. While this may be more speculation than solid scholarship, it is interesting to note that
intentional muddling of political rules would be consistent with expectations from a system
established by an authoritarian regime. Taiwan’s system requires extensive electoral strategizing
to win elections. As such, it would have behooved the KMT to establish a system with complex
and difficult to understand electoral guidelines. This would cripple their opponents’ ability to
strategize effectively, and give the KMT the advantage of maneuvering in a system only they
fully understood.

1991 National Assembly Election

The democractization of Taiwan began with the unraveling of the National Assembly.
By the late 1980’s, the Republic of China’s National Assembly was more than a rubber stamp
organ of the KMT regime. The National Assembly was a symbol, embodying the outdated,
ineffectual, and even comical nature of Taiwan’s political system. Politicians so old that they
had to be physically wheeled into the assembly chamber and accompanied by nurses made up a
majority of one of the nation’s highest governing bodies. The National Assembly’s evolution
and about-face shift from this decrepit state are analogous with the KMT’s own transformation
from a stateless dictatorship in exile, to a truly formidable political force. The story of the
National Assembly also presents a key example of the KMT’s remarkable ability to evolve and
adapt. Skillfully guiding the National Assembly’s transformation into a democratically elected
body allowed the KMT to increase their legitimacy domestically and abroad, while at the same
time shaping a system that would ensure their dominance into the foreseeable future.
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The first National Assembly of the ROC was elected in 1947 when the KMT was still in
control of the Chinese mainland. It was designed to represent all of China and therefore had
representatives elected from each province controlled by the KMT at the time. This meant that
the Assembly was, by its nature, a huge body that boasted more than 3000 members (Chira). It
also meant that the National Assembly was an important political symbol of the ROC’s claim to
the Chinese mainland after its retreat to Taiwan in 1949. To preserve this claim, the ROC
leadership froze all elections for the National Assembly until the KMT had retaken the Chinese
mainland from the Communists.
Over time, as it became clear that the ROC’s stay in Taiwan would not be a temporary
situation, the National Assembly’s structure and membership became an increasingly large
political burden. Almost the entirety of its membership represented areas that were outside of
the ROC’s control. These individuals were paid the equivalent of more than 8,300 U.S. dollars
per month as well as free housing (Yates). As the 1980’s drew to a close, the illegitimacy of the
National Assembly members’ positions was compounded by the fact that most of them were far
too old to be making any real contributions to the Taiwanese political system.
By 1990, the size of the National Assembly had shrunk to 715 members. 84 of these
seats were filled by members elected in Taiwan through supplementary elections, usually after
the previous representative had died of old age. Of the 631 other members of the assembly the
average age was over 80 years old (Yates). The majority of these individuals were in poor health
and had to be wheeled into the Assembly chamber by nurses. In 1988 one member died of a
heart-attack as he was speaking to the assembly (Chira). Another 82 year-old member died of
heart failure after being harassed by demonstrators protesting the situation in the assembly
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(Yates). It became commonplace for aging members to be wheeled out by nurses after being
shaken by conflict in the assembly.
Despite the increasingly ludicrous nature of the situation, removing the elderly assembly
members from office was politically difficult for KMT leadership. Abolishing these positions
would be a symbolic acceptance of the ROC’s permanent exile to Taiwan and run contrary to the
KMT’s One-China principal. Strangely enough, this controversy highlighted commonalities in
KMT and CCP policy towards Taiwan. Both parties were aligned in their view of Taiwan as a
province within the greater Chinese nation. Therefore, on issues such as Taiwanese
independence, the KMT and CCP could conceivably agree and cooperate to a certain degree.
This would later become a key underlying issue in Taiwanese politics as democratic elections
allowed individuals who opposed this policy to gain political power.
By the late 1980’s more liberal KMT leadership under president Lee Teng-hui decided
that resolving the embarrassing situation in the National Assembly would be worth the loss of
this political capital. ROC leadership offered generous pensions and benefits for the aging
assembly members to step down. Almost all refused and it became clear that more decisive
action would need to be taken before the situation could be resolved.
The December 1991 National Assembly election was arguably one of the first and most
significant democratic elections in Taiwanese history. Taiwan scholar and neutral observer in
the 1991 elections, June Teufel Dreyer, commented that the election’s significance did not lie
solely in its effect on later political events but rather in its role as a culmination of events
preceding it (Dreyer, 67). In a 1992 World Affairs article, Dreyer implies that without a
combination of increasingly bold behavior by conservative KMT members, political
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mobilization and protest by Taiwanese youth, and deft political maneuvering by KMT
presidential incumbent Lee Teng-hui, the 1991 election would likely have occurred under
somewhat different circumstances, or possible have not taken place at all (Dreyer, 67).
Additionally, this election and the events preceding it serve as a key example in which the ROC
political party system shaped the electoral system.
Prior to 1990 KMT reformist and conservative factions had been in somewhat of a
stalemate regarding the state of the National Assembly. Conservative KMT members constantly
worked to preserve the status quo and blocked their more liberal counterparts from initiating
reforms within the assembly (Dreyer, 67). Then in early 1990, circumstances changed when
conservative KMT members made an unexpected vie for political control. KMT presidential
incumbent Lee Teng-hui was expected to run unopposed in the 1990 presidential election, but
instead was challenged by an opposition slate put together by elderly KMT conservatives. The
KMT conservatives simultaneously announced their intent to make the National Assembly an
upper house of Parliament with the ability to veto legislation. Additionally, National Assembly
members, who most Taiwanese already considered overpaid, would receive a quadrupled stipend
for their new responsibilities (Dreyer, 67).
These actions sparked outrage in much of the Taiwanese population and resulted in large
scale protests in March of 1990 outside the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial in Taipei. The protesters
demanded sweeping political reforms which they contended were long overdue. Presidential
incumbent Lee Teng-hui responded by stating that he was sympathetic to the protesters’ goals
and would study the proposed reforms at the next government meeting (Roy, 190). At the
National Affairs Conference of June 1990 the proposed reforms were indeed brought forward
and a significant portion was agreed upon; including:
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“(1) all seats in the National Assembly and Legislative Yuan should be opened to
competitive elections; (2) the ROC president, the governor of Taiwan, and the mayors of
Taipei and Kaohsiung should be popularly elected; (3) the special powers vested in the
government due to the ‘communist rebellion” should be discontinued; and (4) the people of
Taiwan rather than the people of Mainland China should be the government’s primary
concern” (Roy, 191).
Although previous nationwide elections had taken place, they were never more than
supplementary elections to replace elderly KMT members who had either died or retired. These
elderly mainlanders were notorious for being both long lived and unwilling to retire from
political office. This ensured that previous supplementary elections were incapable of effecting
any real or direct changes in the Taiwanese political arena. In 1990 the majority of National
Assembly members elected in 1947 were still in office. These individuals were highly unpopular
due to their large and growing disconnect with the Taiwanese people and the current political
realities in Taiwan (Dreyer, 67). Older mainland-elected KMT politicians were so resented in
fact that they were commonly referred to among the Taiwanese people as “old thieves” (老贼)
and were physically attacked by both opposition politicians and protesters (Yates).
Under growing pressure from the Taiwanese people as well as many younger KMT
members, the ROC Supreme Court, known as the Council of Grand Justices, ruled in June of
1990 that all of the National Assembly members elected in the 1947 election must leave office
by the end of 1991 (Dreyer, 67). They subsequently chose December 21st of that year as the date
for the new National Assembly elections. The Council then initiated a much needed
restructuring of the National Assembly, which at the time was still organized in a manner
designed to govern all of Mainland China. While these reforms were widely recognized as
45

necessary, they were highly contested by the opposition DPP who objected to the KMT’s
hegemonic role in the process (Roy, 191).
As the majority party the KMT had near complete control of the restructuring of the
National Assembly. This meant that the electoral rules under which the December 1991 election
was to occur would almost certainly be designed to put the KMT at an advantage vis-à-vis the
opposition DPP. By restructuring the National Assembly in this manner, the KMT worked to
ensure that they would retain the bulk of their political power after Taiwan’s first full nationwide
election. This effect was twofold, as it would not only allow the KMT to maintain control of
Taiwan’s highest governing bodies, but also to control the process of constitutional revision,
which was to be one of the first duties of the newly elected 2nd National Assembly. This meant
that the December 1991 National Assembly election would be crucial to the future of the
Taiwanese democratic system. Whichever party could win the election and emerge dominant in
the National Assembly would effectively have the power to shape the ROC constitution and bend
electoral rules in their favor (Dreyer, 68).
The opposition DPP began the election at a disadvantage due to a lack of resources and
the need to work within the KMT designed electoral system. As such, their goal was simply to
gain enough seats in the National Assembly to block undesirable KMT action, while the KMT’s
goal was to gain enough seats to legislate unhindered by DPP objections. The KMT needed ¾ of
the National Assembly seats in order to control the constitution writing process. Conversely, the
DPP needed more than ¼ in order to influence the process and block proposed KMT changes
that they did not approve of (Dreyer, 68).
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The newly restructured National Assembly had a total of 409 seats, 84 of which had been
filled in a 1986 election and therefore were not up for reelection in 1991. It is interesting to note
that the DPP was technically still illegal at the time of the 1986 supplementary election, as the
martial law imposed ban on opposition parties had not yet been lifted (Roy, 171). This put the
fledgling party at a huge disadvantage in the 1986 election and ensured that the majority of seats
filled in that election were given to the KMT. This left 325 seats up for election in December
1991, which were further divided into 225 seats elected from 58 multi-member single vote
districts, and 100 seats which would be allotted to each party according to their share of the total
vote (Dreyer, 68).
Most Taiwan scholars agree that the majority of these new electoral laws had been
crafted by the KMT to maximize their performance in the elections. In the years prior to the
election the KMT had done extensive research into their electoral performance at the smaller
scale and supplementary elections across Taiwan. This research showed that the KMT usually
fared better within smaller election districts (Dreyer, 68). In these districts the KMT could take
advantage of their more widespread influence to field personable, locally known, candidates on
the KMT ticket. In her 1992 article June Dreyer points out that, while this strategy may prove
useful to the KMT in the immediate future, it could end up causing them problems in long term.
Since the local electorates were more loyal to a specific candidate, rather than the KMT as an
organization, this created greater potential for factionalization within the KMT (Dreyer, 68).
This observation proved to be surprisingly prophetic as this is exactly what happened in the
period between 1996 and 2000, eventually allowing the DPP to win the 2000 presidential
election.
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Controversy also existed over the proportionally appointed portion of the seats.
According to the new electoral guidelines, each voter was to cast one vote, which would count
towards both the directly elected and the proportionally appointed seats. The DPP alleged that
this was tantamount to having a single ballot count for one party twice. They reasoned that this
put them at a disadvantage since many voters would prefer to vote for their locally known KMT
candidate, but may disagree with general KMT party policy and so would choose to vote for the
DPP in the proportional election (Dreyer, 68).
This new set of electoral laws is a clear example of the influence political parties have on
electoral system formation. To a certain degree the situation runs counter to Maurice Duverger’s
famous hypothesis which implies that party systems are formed by electoral systems, and
supports Kenneth Benoit’s hypothesis that electoral systems can also be shaped by party systems
(Benoit, 363). The circumstances surrounding this election can be described as a political party
deliberately creating an electoral system, expecting that it will in turn reinforce the type of party
system that they desire. This adheres to Benoit’s assertion that political party systems and
electoral systems tend to have an endogenous relationship (Benoit, 363).
Despite its many disadvantages, most expected the DPP to perform well in the 1991
National Assembly elections. At the time of the 1989 supplementary Legislative Yuan elections
the DPP was still a relatively new and inexperienced party, yet it won more than 31 percent of
the vote (Dreyer, 68). Most observers felt that the DPP had made significant gains in electoral
experience, party organization, and political reputation since this time and therefore would
perform better in the 1991 elections. DPP leaders were even confident enough to announce
publically that they expected to receive 40 to 50 percent of the vote (Dreyer, 68). The results of
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the election proved all of these assumptions incorrect as the DPP won less than a quarter of the
open seats, while the KMT won more than 71 percent (Roy, 193).
There are several theories as to why the DPP preformed so poorly in the 1991 election
which tend to vary greatly based on the political alignment of the source. One of the most
prevalent lines of reasoning is that DPP candidates overemphasized the independence issue and
frightened potential voters. The highly vocal support for independence by DPP candidates
indicated an inherently hostile position vis-à-vis mainland China, who had explicitly stated their
intent to invade Taiwan if independence was declared (Roy, 193). Another possibility is that the
workings of the new electoral structure put the DPP at a disadvantage from the beginning. This
position tends to be emphasized by DPP supporters and has some degree of factual support. As
previously discussed, the electoral system under which the 1991 elections had taken place was
designed entirely by the KMT. The DPP had highly objected to this system since its inception
and even seriously considered boycotting the 1991 election in protest (Dreyer, 68). Both of these
theories have merit and it seems likely some combination of these two factors that played the
determining role in the outcome of the 1991 elections.
1996 Presidential Election
The 1996 Presidential Election is often pointed to as the most significant in Taiwanese
history. The election represented the culmination of the KMT’s efforts to democratize Taiwan
while maintaining political control. The establishment of a directly elected presidency would
make it increasingly difficult for critics of the KMT to argue that Taiwan was simply a façade
democracy designed to protect the party’s interests. It also meant that the KMT would have to
rely on more than clever manipulation of the electoral system to maintain its political hegemony.
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Despite ironic and unintended aid from the PRC in KMT’s the 1996 electoral victory, the
election would mark the beginning of fundamental problems with the KMT party organization.
These issues would eventually present yet another opportunity for the party to prove its resilience
and adaptability in the face of adversity.
The 1996 presidential election was the first time in Taiwanese history that the leader of
the nation would be directly democratically elected. Additionally, the election was an important
step in further shifting the country towards a presidential system. Previously, although Taiwan
had formally been a semi-presidential system, the president was chosen by the National
Assembly. This had left the country leaning in the direction of a parliamentary system, since the
president was put in place by the chief legislative body. With a direct presidential election,
however, the National Assembly lost a good deal of its influence over the president and the
considerable powers he wielded.
In 1966 the National Assembly had assigned further powers to the president. These
included extended emergency powers and the power to create a National Security Council
(Copper, 95). At the time these increased presidential powers also increased the power of the
National Assembly since they were the ones who selected both the president and vice-president.
The newly independent presidential office was now free of this tie and could exercise these
powers largely free of National Assembly influence. These changes placed the president as one
of the single most powerful and influential figures in the Taiwanese political arena.
Factionalization within the KMT played an important role in the lead up to the 1996
election. Two high-ranking former KMT officials, former Taiwan governor Lin Yang-kang, and
Control Yuan president Chen Li-an ran against incumbent Lee Teng-hui (Roy, 199). Many
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anticipated that this would split the KMT vote and would both lead to a close election and
increase the chances of a DPP victory. Lin and Chen represented somewhat more conservative
political factions than Lee Teng-hui and both aimed at improving relations with mainland China.
Lin went one step further and, in addition to strongly supporting the One-China policy,
demanded and greater political and economic ties to the PRC (Roy, 199).
By the time the campaigning began for the 1996 Presidential Election it had become clear
that Lee Teng-hui was an advocate of Taiwan’s de facto independence from mainland China.
This, coupled with the unsettling democratic precedent that the ROC was setting with its first
presidential election, greatly worried PRC leadership. They responded with a massive smear
campaign against Lee Teng-hui which attempted to paint him as a traitor and a danger to the
fragile peace between Taiwan and the mainland. Additionally, as the election time drew closer
Beijing launched a series of missile tests into the Taiwan strait in an attempt to dissuade
Taiwanese voters from electing Lee Teng-hui (Roy, 199). These clearly threatening gestures of
force made the threat of armed conflict with the PRC seem like a more real possibility than it had
for most of the ROC’s time on Taiwan. It also evoked a military reaction from the U.S. who,
according to the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, had a vague commitment to protect Taiwan from
PRC military force (Roy, 200).
Ironically, the PRC’s reaction to the situation was a significant contributing factor in Lee
Teng-hui’s overwhelming victory in the 1996 presidential race. Rather than being intimidated by
the missile tests, Taiwanese voters were outraged that Beijing would attempt to use the threat of
violence to influence the election (Copper, 116). Both Lin and Chen had publically agreed with
Beijing’s accusations that Lee Teng-hui and his pro-independence plots were the cause of the
current conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Additionally, Lin and his running mate had condemned the
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U.S. military intervention in Chinese affairs (Roy, 201). These factors caused many Taiwanese
to believe that Lin and Chen were pro-Beijing and therefore associate them with the recent PRC
aggression.
As a result of increased Taiwanese patriotic sentiment, many of the effects of KMT
factionalization were nullified in the 1996 election. Voters rallied behind Lee Teng-hui and gave
him a landslide victory with 54 percent of the votes cast. This was more than double the number
of votes received by the second highest candidate, the DPP’s Peng Ming-min, at just over 21
percent. It was also more than the combined votes received by all three of the other candidates
(Copper, 118). The resounding effect of this lessening of KMT factionalization is particularly
interesting to note in comparison to the next presidential election in 2000, when split KMT
voting is thought to have significantly contributed to the DPP’s victory.
Perhaps the greatest factor in Lee Teng-hui’s victory was the simple fact of his
incumbency. Lee had held the office of president for 6 years and had overseen a period of great
political liberalization and economic development in Taiwan. Economic stability, peace, and
continued de facto independence from the PRC were all seen to be solid bets under the Lee
campaign (Copper, 119-120). In comparison, the DPP had fielded a candidate who had little
political experience and had been living abroad for the past several years. The candidate, Peng
Ming-min, therefore lacked a solid voter base and appeared a dangerous choice due to his
inexperience, especially in light of the recent rise in tensions across the Taiwan Strait (Copper,
119).
The conclusion of the 1996 presidential election was an important watershed in
Taiwanese political history for several reasons. First, it marked the consolidation of Taiwan’s
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democracy and solidified its position vis-à-vis mainland China. The election was widely hailed
by the international community as a victory for democracy in Asia and presented a favorable
image of Taiwan to many world powers, including the United States. It would now be
exceedingly difficult for the PRC to justify the military conquest of the small democratic nation
by an authoritarian power. This gave at least a temporary guarantee of Taiwan’s de facto
independence for some time to come. Additionally, the election embodied the playing out of
many important themes that would influence future Taiwanese elections. Among these were the
importance of party factionalization in electoral outcomes, the advantages for the KMT in its
history of promoting political and economic stability, and the importance of relative moderation
on the issue of Taiwanese independence.
2000 Presidential Election and DPP Rule
Following their 1996 Presidential election victory, the KMT faced a series of problems
that hurt the party’s image, weakened its political structure, and ultimately ended up costing
them the presidency. Among these, the two most widely accepted factors behind the KMT’s loss
were pervasive corruption, and high levels of factionalization and infighting within the party.
These, coupled with an unusually united DPP and the emergence of a skilled opposition
candidate, sealed the KMT’s fate for the election ahead.
As increasing numbers of young Taiwanese joined the KMT, party discipline and
centralization began to see noticeable decline. Democratization caused local KMT factions to be
more relevant and enjoy greater levels of autonomy. Since these groups knew more about local
conditions and were more capable of winning elections, the central KMT organization in Taipei
had little choice but to turn over control of local affairs to them. As a result, these groups were
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apt to disregard direction from KMT leadership, field candidates not officially endorsed by the
KMT, and support positions that ran counter to party line (Roy, 205). To make matters worse,
elements of traditional Taiwanese culture such as clientelism and gift-giving, began to translate
into widespread vote-buying practices by KMT candidates. Not only did this practice damage
the KMT’s image and legitimacy, but it also placed a large financial strain on the party.
Candidates often spent millions of dollars on campaigns, much of which went to cover the costs
of gifts, favors, and ballot purchases (Roy, 205).
Corruption also became widespread during this period as the KMT became increasingly
reliant on organized crime groups to ensure electoral victories. Gangs would use their influence
to secure the vote of certain groups and areas for a particular candidate. After the election, the
candidate would then repay the gangs either through direct financial compensation, or
preferential treatment of gang-owned businesses (Roy, 206). Graft was commonplace and many
public works projects suffered as a result. “Black gold” (黑金) became a common colloquial
expression used to refer to corrupt politics, graft, and organized crime. Corruption became so
engrained in the basic KMT party structure that it became apparent to many Taiwanese that the
KMT was becoming increasingly incapable of effectively fighting organized crime. By
prosecuting gang leaders the KMT would be undercutting key sectors of their own support base
and damaging their ability to win elections. This situation damaged both the effective
functioning of the KMT party machine, and the party’s image among the Taiwanese people.
KMT party discipline and organization also began to decline in the late 1990’s. Party
leaders increasingly fought against one another and local KMT factions often entered into violent
clashes with each other (Roy, 206). As the 1990’s drew to a close this situation grew
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increasingly worse and eventually culminated in the disastrous 2000 election voting split
between James Soong and Lien Chan.
James Soong was both a popular and highly qualified candidate for the presidency. He
held a PhD from Georgetown University, had a long record of experience in political office, and
was the first elected governor of Taiwan (Copper 2013, 58). Soong was also much more popular
among the Taiwanese people than Lee Teng-hui’s chosen successor Lien Chan. Lien Chan had
similar political qualifications to Soong, but was seen as somewhat detached from the Taiwanese
people, which cost him greatly in the opinion polls. Despite this, incumbent president Lee Tenghui was insistent that Lien Chan receive the KMT nomination for president over James Soong.
Soong was outraged and decided to run as in independent in the 2000 election. This led to
Soong’s ejection from the KMT and an inevitable split in the KMT vote (Copper 2013, 58).
At the beginning of the 2000 presidential election James Soong was much farther ahead
in the poles than either Lien Chan or DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian. It seemed apparent at this
time that Soong would easily defeat both of his opponents and claim the presidency despite his
status as an independent candidate. However, a scandal emerged near election time that badly
damaged Soong’s image and position vis-à-vis Lien Chan and Chen. KMT members began
publically accusing Soong of funneling party funds into his and his relatives’ bank accounts
during his term as KMT secretary general. This severely hindered Soong’s campaign, much of
which had been based on his image as a clean politician and ability to fight corruption. The
charges against Soong were later dropped but the damage was already done (Copper 2013, 58).
Yoshiyuki Ogasawara of Tokyo Foreign Studies University provides an interesting
Chinese language assessment of James Soong’s 2000 presidential candidacy and its implications.
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The work, whose title can be translated as “A Study of the 2000 Taiwan Presidential Election’s
James Soong Phenomenon”, analyses why James Soong lost the election despite high levels of
popular support. Ogasawara contends that, without a strong political party structure to support
him, Soong was at a grievous disadvantage in the elections. According to Ogasawara, this factor
more than any other ultimately made James Soong unelectable despite high levels of popular
support (Ogasawara).
Ogasawara’s assertion highlights several interesting facets of Taiwan’s party and
electoral systems. First, the party system is an inseparable part of the Taiwanese electoral
process. Without party participation it is essentially impossible for an individual to gain
significant political power in Taiwan. This is a fairly common feature of democratic systems and,
on the surface, is a mundane phenomenon. What is more interesting is what the ‘James Soong
Phenomenon’ illustrates in the story of KMT party and electoral system manipulation. By the
end of the 1990’s the KMT had established party and electoral systems that guaranteed their
dominant role in the political process. Despite serious issues of inter-party conflict, loss of party
discipline, and corruption, KMT party support remained the decisive factor in the outcome of the
election. This carried important implications for events following the 2000 election. The
KMT’s entrenchment ensured that the KMT could return to its dominant position after the
reestablishment of party discipline.
In contrast to KMT party infighting, the DPP was unusually united in the 2000 election
campaign. They had learned from many years of struggling as an opposition party the value of
cohesiveness in campaigning season. Additionally, they had learned the political necessity of
moderating some of their more controversial positions, especially those concerning TaiwanChina relations. In mid-1999 the DPP passed a resolution accepting the status-quo of Taiwan56

China relations on the grounds that Taiwan already enjoyed de-facto independence and therefore
had no need to declare formal independence at the time (Roy, 228). While a small radical
minority of Taiwanese independence activists were upset by this position, it was widely well
received by the majority of the Taiwanese population. This established the DPP as a more
moderate party with a much cleaner image than the rival KMT.
The DPP was also aided significantly by the campaigning skill of their chosen candidate,
Chen Shui-bian. Chen was different from the other candidates in a variety of ways. Both Lien
Chan and James Soong had extensive governing experience within the KMT and had both held
several high ranking national government positions. By comparison, the highest office Chen
Shui-bian could claim was mayor of Taipei, an office which he lost to KMT candidate Ma Yingjeou. Additionally, Chen differed from his opponents in his relative youth and poor family
background (Copper, 58). Despite frequent criticism on these topics by opponents, Chen was
deftly able to portray these apparent disadvantages to the public in a way that bolstered his image
among the people. He presented his upbringing in a poor rural village in southern Taiwan as
proof that he was a man of the people who was sensitive to their needs, rather than the desires of
the political elite in Taipei. His youth and lack of governing experience relative to his opponents
allowed him to convincingly claim that he would present a clean break with the old KMT style
of government, which had gained an increasing bad reputation as corrupt and stagnant.
Many of Chen’s campaigning strategies are exemplified in one of his campaign ads for
the 2000 presidential election. The content is clearly aimed at evoking a sense of Taiwanese
nationalism in viewers. The images depict the lives of everyday lower-middle class Taiwanese
and are accompanied by a narration in which Chen describes their desire for peace and a simple
life. In the narration he specifically states that “[These] Taiwanese are not as complicated as the
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foreign world. They have never contemplated putting their money overseas.” This is somewhat
of an overt appeal to Taiwanese nationalism and a statement against closer economic ties with
mainland China. It is interesting to note this position in particular, as many of Chen’s later
policies would substantially increase Taiwan’s economic ties with the PRC (Chen, 2006).
The ad then proceeds with Chen narrating that “They [the common Taiwanese] want a
stable life, not war.” This emphasis on peace continues for the remainder of the ad, as the phrase
“Peaceful Taiwan” is repeated over and over. This focus is likely a response to common feelings
that the DPP was too radical of a party and would instigate a war with China by declaring
independence. Sentiment of this sort had played a key role in the DPP’s defeat in the 1996
presidential election and Chen Shui-bian was likely trying to counter these notions here (Chen,
2006).
PRC leaders attempts to influence the 2000 presidential election again backfired and
helped sure up the vote for their least desired candidate. PRC media outlets and political leaders,
including the premier, issued cutting criticisms of Chen Shui-bian and implied that a victory for
the DPP candidate could lead to war (Copper, 59). This had the effect of inciting many
Taiwanese voters who wanted to prove that the PRC could not diminish their democratic rights
through threats of armed violence.
When the final vote was tallied Chen Shui-bian won with 39.3 percent, while James
Soong and Lien Chan received 36.8 percent and 23 percent respectively (Roy, 230). Despite all
of the factors in his favor Chen Shui-bian had only won by the narrow margin of two percent. It
was clear to most that without the KMT’s negative campaigning against James Soong he would
have won the election handily. Lien Chan’s embarrassing 23 percent temporarily ended his
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sponsor Lee Teng-hui’s political career. Upon the announcement of the election results, a
massive crowd, which grew to several thousand, gathered in front of the KMT’s main party
building in Taipei and protested until Lee Teng-hui agreed to step down as KMT party chairman.
On the same day that Lee Teng-hui stepped down, James Soong formed the Peoples First Party
(PFP) and signaled a permanent split of the KMT voting bloc (Roy, 231). Despite these setbacks
the KMT was far from defeated and would go on to serve as a powerful opposition force for the
next eight years of Chen Shui-bian’s presidency.
The Chen administration and the 2008 Return of the KMT
Chen Shui-bian’s government experienced serious problems throughout his time in office,
many of which began almost immediately after his inauguration and intensified over time. Chief
among these were Chen’s weak mandate for rule, Taiwan’s stagnating economy, growing
corruption among government officials, and strained relations with both the U.S. and the PRC.
While Chen Shui-bian was able to weather the 2004 presidential reelection, the circumstances of
his victory were questionable and led to a further decline in his image both in Taiwan and abroad.
The combination of these factors lead to the overwhelming defeat of the DPP in the 2008
presidential election and the return of the KMT as the governing power in Taiwan.
As previously discussed, Chen Shui-bian had won the 2000 election by only a slim
margin of the vote and was significantly aided by a series of fortunate events preceding the
election. While he had the presidency, he had a weak mandate and little control of the
government beyond the executive office. The KMT was in control of the Legislative Yuan and
an overwhelming majority of the government bureaucracy were KMT affiliated (Roy, 232). This
left the Chen in a weak position and made it highly difficult to pass any sort of legislation
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without making significant concessions to the KMT opposition. As a result, Chen was able to
deliver on very few of his original campaign promises. Over time this began to anger the DPP
and many other of his former supporters. One DPP affiliated group issued a report publically
criticizing him for his ineffectuality as early as August of 2000 (Roy, 232). Internal opposition
to Chen and his policies began to drive a wedge in the DPP camp between Chen supporters and
those who favored a more assertive stance against the KMT and China. This divide eventually
became so bad that before the end of Chen’s presidency in 2008 former DPP chairman Shih
Ming-teh launched a massive anti-Chen campaign. Over a million Taiwanese participated in
several of his rallies, most of whom were DPP supporters against Chen and his policies (Copper,
61).
The Taiwanese economy also fared badly under the Chen administration. By the second
year of Chen Shui-bian’s presidency the economy had seen negative growth of more than two
percent of gross national product (GNP), currency had devalued by 10 percent, and the stock
market had fallen by more than 40 percent (Democracy on Trial, 77). Most Taiwanese had spent
the majority of their lives under the prosperous economic conditions that the KMT regime had
overseen. To them, these economic hardships were a new phenomenon and could only be
attributed to Chen Shui-bian’s poor handling of the economy. Chen and his supporters argued
that the opposition KMT was deliberately taking action to damage the economy and discredit his
leadership (Democracy on Trial, 38). KMT affiliated individuals did indeed have a controlling
hand in Taiwan’s stock market and its private sector, and as such were hypothetically capable of
taking such action. It is, however, still a matter of some debate as to whether these individuals
would willingly do so much damage to their economic interests in order to delegitimize the Chen
administration.
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Lee Teng-hui reemerged onto the political scene in 2001 to assist the beleaguered Chen
administration combat KMT attempts at strengthening cross-strait relations with China. He
formed the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) to draw in disaffected politicians who supported the
DPP’s position on Taiwanese sovereignty but were more conservative on social and economic
issues. This effectively created what came to be known as the pan-green camp, with the DPP
and TSU working together to counter the pan-blue camp of the KMT and PFP. This dynamic is
interesting to note as it places the status of Taiwan’s party system in somewhat of a grey area.
While both the TSU and the PFP are important to the relative political power of the DPP and
KMT, they have little power on their own. The two auxiliary parties function largely to support
and influence their corresponding larger party. This indicates that, despite the involvement of
multiple relevant political parties, Taiwan is still by and large a two-party system.
Lee Teng-hui and the TSU bolstered Chen’s support before the 2004 reelection. Despite
this, most observers predicted that Chen would lose the election to the powerful team of Lien
Chan and James Soong, who had united to run against him (Copper, 60). With the heads of both
the KMT and PFP appearing on one ticket there would be no splitting of the pan-blue camp vote
in the 2004 election. Additionally, both candidates had extensive experience governing during
the period of Taiwan’s economic miracle. This contrasted strongly with the poor performance of
the economy under Chen Shui-bian’s administration.
The 2004 presidential debate was the first in Taiwanese history. It presented an excellent
example of both sides’ campaign strategies and, in a larger sense, the strategies of the pan-green
and pan-blue camps. Chen Shui-bian largely emphasized social issues and attempted to evoke
Taiwanese nationalist sentiments. Lien Chan, on the other hand, focused on economic issues and
gave his positions a much more international focus (Gtwisp, 2012).
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Language played an important symbolic role in the 2004 presidential debate. Although
the debate was conducted largely in the official language of standard Mandarin Chinese, both
sides utilized other dialects in their speeches to attempt to broaden their support base. This was
especially important for the Chen Shui-bian and the DPP. Both candidates spoke at some point
in the Taiwanese Hokkien dialect, however, Chen Shui-bian emphasized the language and used it
at several points in the debate. He also spoke in the Hakka dialect and used Hakka folk sayings
to illustrate his points. In the question and answer segment, the first question Chen asks Lien
Chan is: “In the short time since I took office we have established the first Council for Hakka
Affairs, Hakka television station, and Hakka research institute to help the Hakka people. Why
did you never do this?” Both of these strategies are consistent with Chen and the DPP’s plays on
ethnic sentiments throughout the campaign. The DPP recognized that it was unlikely to garner
much of the mainlander vote and instead tried to position itself as the defender of ethnic
Taiwanese and minority rights. From an electoral perspective this was a viable strategy, since
approximately 70 percent of the Taiwanese population was comprised of non-mainlander ethnic
groups.
Chen Shui-bian’s second central talking point was the KMT’s record of corruption. As
previously discussed, the KMT had a bad reputation of corrupt activity by the end of the 1990’s
which contributed to Chen Shui-bian’s victory in 2000. Chen utilized this reputation again in the
2004 debates, repeated connecting “black gold” (黑金) and the KMT. Near the opening of his
speech Chen made several scathing attacks on the KMT: “Because of the obviousness of black
gold, because of the uncaring KMT regime, because of unequal legislation, the roots of our
country were constantly shaken…the KMT have continued to recklessly disregard the foundation
of our nation.” Chen also made more direct attacks on his opponents, listing a host of famous
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traitors and corrupt officials and saying that these were the people that stood beside Mr. Chan
and Mr. Soong. He then concluded with the final condemnation: “There is no way we can trust
these people. We want Taiwan to keep developing, but these people say one thing and do
another.”
In contrast to Chen Shui-bian’s ethnic and moral appeals, Lien Chan chose to focus on
economic performance and international relations in the 2004 presidential debate. Chan began
by asking the audience to reframe their understanding of the issues: “We are not talking about
personal taste…Let’s examine things from a macro perspective, look at things through the lens
of history.” In essence, Lien Chan asked the listeners to not be swayed by Chen Shui-bian’s
ethnic and emotional appeals, but rather to consider things from a practical standpoint. Chan
followed this by asserting that the election is not about a specific candidate or party, but about a
choice between two attitudes. To illustrate this point he referenced the reactions of China and
Japan encountering the West 100 years ago. China reacted with the Boxer Rebellion, while
Japan initiated the Meiji Restoration. As a consequence, China failed and Japan succeeded. The
lesson that Lien Chan illustrates with this point is thick with powerful implications: “resistance
led to subjugation, adaptation and reform led to success” (抗拒亡国， 适应改变成功了). This
is clearly an argument supporting focus on progress and development and a strong counter to
Chen Shui-bian’s plays on nationalist and ethnic sentiment. It also has the more subtle function
of supporting the KMT’s policy on cross-strait relations. By outright resistance, Taiwan would
be subjugated just as the Boxers were. However, by maintaining open relations and learning
from their opponent, Taiwan can become strong, just as the Japanese did.
Lien Chan emphasized the poor economic performance of the Chen administration as
another key point. He asserted that under Chen, Taiwan had not kept up with globalization and
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liberalization, had seen significant economic decline, and had been degraded in the eyes of many
foreign nations. Lien Chan even went so far as to state that Chen Shui-bian’s government had
overseen failures of historical proportions stating: “The current administration has created many
new Taiwanese miracles.” These “miracles” were then described by Chan as economic disasters
including the highest unemployment rate in Taiwanese history and a huge spike in the suicide
and murder rates.
It is also interesting to note the fundamental difference in attitude towards globalization
exhibited by Lien Chan and Chen Shui-bian. Chen’s fundamental opposition to globalization is
exhibited in both in this debate and in the 2000 campaign advertisement discussed previously. In
the advertisement he specifically states “They [the Taiwanese people] have never thought of
putting their money abroad.” In the debate he constantly associates globalization with Taiwan’s
subjugation to China. Conversely, Lien Chan stressed the importance of strong international
relations and globalization to Taiwan’s development. He indicated that without a peaceful and
safe international situation there was no way for Taiwan to progress.
The question and answer portion of the debate was perhaps even more telling of the DPP
and KMT’s electoral strategies. Chen Shui-bian constantly brought up ethnic issues and
emphasized the ethnic divide in Taiwan. Lien Chan, on the other hand, played these issues down
and chose instead to focus on specific economic and political policy issues. Chen countered
nearly every criticism of his economic policies with accusations that Lien Chan was trying to sell
out Taiwan to China. After several exchanges of this sort occurred, a pattern emerged which
exemplified the respective parties key electoral strategies. Chen Shui-bian and the DPP
attempted capitalize on ethnic divisions and fears that the KMT would submit Taiwan to PRC
control. Lien Chan and the KMT attempted to focus voter attention on performance and
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efficiency issues to portray themselves as the practical choice for Taiwan’s growth and
development. In essence, these were the same strategies that these parties had utilized since the
beginnings of democracy in Taiwan with slight adjustments for current conditions.
The day before voting was to take place both Chen Shui-bian and his wife were shot and
superficially wounded. Chen ordered the police and military to remain at their posts on election
day, and prevented this sizeable group from voting. The majority of these individuals were
KMT supporters and would likely have swung the election in the favor of the Lien-Soong ticket.
This action allowed Chen Shui-bian to win the election by a narrow margin, and caused outrage
among KMT supporters. Chen Shui-bian’s already weak mandate was further diminished by
these questionable circumstances, and his image was further damaged in Taiwan and abroad
(Copper 2013, 60).
Chen Shui-bian faced a difficult situation in regards to cross-strait relations with China
since his first day in office. China demanded Chen’s commitment to the One-China principle as
a precondition to resuming dialogue with the ROC. This left Chen with the difficult choice
between exceedingly tense relations with the PRC or appearing hypocritical and alienating nearly
his entire party and support base. Even DPP moderates, who were satisfied with de facto
independence, would not be able to accept a president of their own party openly denouncing
Taiwanese independence. Chen attempted to remedy this situation by make other concessions to
Beijing, including several economic compromises loosening the restrictions of cross-strait trade
and investment (Roy, 237). This caused Chen to draw sharp criticism from many DPP members
who alleged that he was weakening Taiwan’s position by making the island economically
dependent on the mainland. It also did not have the desired effect on relations with the PRC, as
CCP leaders continued to insist on political concessions as a prerequisite for dialogue (Roy, 237).
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Relations continued to deteriorate as Chen’s presidency wore on and his continued refusal to
reaffirm the One-China policy, and actions such as attempting to join the United Nations agitated
Beijing leadership.
Near the beginning of Chen Shui-bian’s presidency relations with the United States were
good. The Bush administration often praised democratic Taiwan and engaged in several arms
sales to the island to increase its security. This support lessened over time following the
September 11 bombings and the entry of the U.S. into the War on Terror. U.S. leadership began
to resent the tense relations that Chen maintained with mainland China. There was constant
worry in Washington that Chen’s firm position on independence and actions taken to politically
distance Taiwan from the mainland could draw the U.S. into a war with China. Eventually Chen
came to be viewed as more of a liability than an asset. In 2006 U.S. leadership flew KMT
presidential hopeful Ma Ying-jeou to Washington and feted him while Chen was denied transit
through any major U.S. city (Democracy on Trial, 81).
Corruption was a persistent issue that both hobbled the Chen administration’s governing
effectiveness and ate away at its legitimacy. It would eventually prove to be the final nail in the
coffin for the struggling administration. KMT corruption had been a key campaigning point for
the DPP over the last decade and was a decisive factor in many of their electoral victories
(Democracy on Trial, 61). This made growing corrupt practices under Chen Shui-bian appear
especially heinous in the eyes of voters, and each new emerging scandal dealt a serious blow to
the legitimacy of the administration. Between January and November of 2006 715 government
officials were convicted of corruption charges (Democracy on Trial, 63). Over time, Chen Shuibian’s son, son-in-law, and wife were also alleged with having engaged in corrupt activity. After
his wife was indicted, the prosecutor made the startling announcement that Chen was also likely
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directly involved and would have been indicted if not for his presidential immunity (Democracy
on Trial, 64). This revelation led to massive anti-Chen movements, including the previously
mentioned rallies organized by former DPP chairman Shih Ming-teh.
The following graph depicts Taiwanese voter party affiliation from 2004 to 2014. Survey
respondents indicating KMT affiliation are illustrated by the blue line, while DPP respondents
are illustrated in green. The grey line represents neutral or non-affiliated voters, and the lower
colored lines mostly indicate smaller parties such as the TSU and the New Party. The graph
provides a visual representation of declining DPP support levels across Chen Shui-bian’s
presidency. Beginning in 2004, following Chen’s dubious presidential election victory, DPP
support levels began to see noticeable decline. A sharp drop in support for the DPP can be seen
closely mirroring the previously mentioned period of government corruption scandals from
January to November of 2006. After the initial shock of these events, support levels normalized
to a degree, but the DPP was left in a prolonged weakened condition. Conversely, KMT support
levels rose and remained relatively high over the same period. It is also interesting to note the
decline in small party affiliation following the 2004 constitutional reforms. Both the New Party
and the TSU saw significant drops in voter affiliation following the reforms. The 2008 election
sealed the fates of the smaller parties and both fell to near negligible levels of support.
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Source: Taiwan Indicators Survey Research (TISR) (台湾指标民调) http://www.tisr.com.tw/

When the 2008 presidential elections finally arrived the results were unsurprising to most.
The DPP candidate Frank Hsieh was soundly defeated by the KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou. Ma won by
a landslide and received more votes than any presidential candidate in ROC history (Copper, 61).
He ran his campaign on platforms including improved relations with the U.S. and China,
cleaning up Taiwan’s corrupt government, and revitalizing Taiwan’s struggling economy. Ma
eventually delivered on all of these promises, although the global economic downturn in 2008
slowed Taiwan’s economic recovery for several years (Copper 2013, 61). Since his election
Ma’s performance as president has generally been viewed as positive. In the 2012 presidential
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election he beat his DPP opponent Tsai Ying-wen by a large margin. The performance of the Ma
administration and victory in consecutive elections placed the KMT in a position of political
dominance in Taiwan that it retains to this day (Copper 2013, 63).
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Conclusion:
At the time of this writing there are currently large scale protests in Taipei which have
received extensive domestic and international media attention. The protests, dubbed ‘the
Sunflower Revolution’ by the Taiwanese media are largely student movements opposing a
KMT-designed trade agreement with the PRC. There are two main reasons behind the
emergence of such strong opposition to the trade deal. One is that many Taiwanese fear that the
new deal will make Taiwan too economically dependent on China and compromise its
sovereignty. This argument is largely self-explanatory and has been the most widespread
rallying cry for the student protesters. The second, and perhaps more key factor driving the
protests, is the manner in which the KMT produced the new trade agreement. Negotiations,
structuring, and formulation of the agreement all took place behind closed doors and the deal
emerged more as an inevitable political fact, rather than a proposed piece of legislation (Cole).
This situation reflects an unusual break in the KMT history of subtle manipulation.
Rather than attempting to pass the new trade deal through management of the traditional
channels of negotiation and legislation, the KMT has attempted to force the new deal through in
a somewhat heavy handed manner. The implications of this shift in behavioral patterns are
intriguing and merit further study. They are, however, beyond the scope of this thesis. The
Sunflower Revolution is a popular movement, rather than any sort of formal electoral campaign.
Such events are certainly politically significant, however, they are not directly relevant to my
study of KMT political party and electoral system manipulation. In order to preserve the quality
and depth of my research, I have elected to leave analysis of such events to future scholars.
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Taiwan’s political history, including the nature of the relationship between its political
party and electoral systems is extremely complex. It would be impossible to provide a complete
analysis of all the factors involved in these systems’ formation and development in the course of
one work. What I hope that this thesis has accomplished, however, is to provide an analysis of
several key contributing factors and drawing conclusions on their role therein. I will qualify the
following conclusions with the reminder that they represent events and circumstances as they
appear in Taiwan. While it may be possible to utilize them as a case study to draw broader
conclusions on political science theory, that is not their primary purpose here. Further research
on how these phenomenon manifest themselves in other nations would likely be required to draw
such conclusions and is beyond the scope of this thesis.
First, the Taiwanese electoral system is a result of the political party system. The
electoral system was shaped by the KMT during the time of their near total political dominance.
It was consciously designed to maintain KMT control after the transition to democracy. The
electoral system was also designed to maintain the KMT dominated party system. It has changed
over time to suit the changing needs of the KMT, as well as to accommodate the rise of
opposition parties.
This leads to my second conclusion: Taiwanese electoral laws are not static phenomenon.
They change according to shifts in power among political actors as well as the changing needs of
those currently in power. As the DPP gained political power in Taiwan, both it and the KMT
initiated electoral system reforms. While these changes sometimes solidified the DPP’s position,
it was usually not at the expense of the KMT. Rather, most reforms had the effect of slowly
diminishing and marginalizing smaller parties.
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Next, are some conclusions and summary regarding relevant developments in the
Taiwanese political landscape. In the 1990’s, following Taiwan’s transition to democracy, the
KMT initially held a very strong position. This situation represents somewhat of an outlier
among former authoritarian parties and is largely an outcome of two unusual features of KMT
rule. First, the KMT oversaw a long period of great economic prosperity in Taiwan. This led to
a high degree of support for the regime among the Taiwanese people. Second, is that the KMT
initiated a transition to democracy at the height of its popularity. This decision allowed them to
retain a high degree of political competitiveness and mandate to rule even after democratic
transition. More importantly, it allowed them to control the transition to democracy and
formulate electoral laws in their favor.
Despite this initial high level of support, the KMT position gradually eroded as the 1990s
drew to a close. A combination of rising corruption and factionalization within the KMT led to
their defeat by the DPP in the 2000 presidential election. It also led to the rise of two other
parties, the PFP and the TSU, and the temporary appearance of an emerging multiparty system.
The parties in power, the KMT and the DPP, accordingly altered electoral laws to marginalize
these parties and secure their power.
Over the course of the 2000s, the DPP lost support, as problems with corruption, the
economy, and foreign relations made the party seem increasingly incompetent. Fundamental
differences in party priorities between the DPP and KMT provide clues as to the origins of these
problems. The DPP was never focused on economic development or maintaining strong foreign
relations. Their strategy has always been, therefore, to emphasize the threat of the PRC and
ethnic divides in Taiwan. As the economy languished and ordinary Taiwanese began suffering,
these issues seemed increasingly unimportant in comparison to economic security. After the
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Chen Shui-bian corruption scandal, the DPP effectively had no remaining legitimate party
platform. As such they were doomed to lose in both the 2008 and 2012 elections. Since the
electoral reforms in the mid-2000’s had marginalized most third parties, these circumstances
effectively guaranteed KMT control in the years to come. This situation adds to my thesis that
even when electoral reforms apparently benefited the opposition, they were never to the
detriment of the KMT.
The KMT has proved surprisingly skilled at maintaining long term political control.
Despite its authoritarian roots, the party has deftly navigated campaigning, elections, and
governance in Taiwan’s democratic system. Much of this was made possible through the KMT’s
careful control of Taiwan’s political party and electoral system development. The party took
advantage of the relationship between these two systems to alter circumstances in indirect and
discrete ways. By forming appropriate electoral systems, the KMT was able to able to ensure the
formation of a party system that would suit their needs. Later, as conditions changed, the KMT
was able to further legislate electoral evolution to eliminate potential challenges to their political
control. While this has not always been a smooth and exact process, the small setbacks the KMT
has faced have been just enough to solidify the legitimate and competitive nature of Taiwan’s
democratic system. In short, if all of the world’s authoritarian groups were as skilled at power
and legitimacy maintenance as the KMT, democracy would exist in name alone.
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